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I. Thesis
There is an important kind of legal scholarship that should be
done to a much greater extent than it is now. I call this type of schol-
arship the interdisciplinary study of legal evolution (ISLE). Its object
is to understand, to predict, and to influence changes in legal rules
and in the institutions that they shape.
At its best, this kind of study should have four important charac-
teristics. First, it should be more scientific in aspiration than are
most historians' accounts of legal change: it should seek to identify
and to test lawlike generalizations about changes in specific fields of
law. Second, it should be more systematic and methodical than are
many historians' accounts of legal change: a major effort should be
made, in one area after another, to examine interesting legal changes
by use of an identifiable set of procedures. Third, it should be more
interdisciplinary than are many traditional accounts by lawyers of le-
gal rules: it should use the concepts, data, and empirical studies sup-
plied by the social sciences-principally by economics in many areas,
but by other fields as well. Fourth, it should be more institutional and
doctrinal than is some of the interesting recent theoretical work by
economic analysts on the evolution of the common law: its analysis
of systems of legal rules and nonlegal practices should be detailed
in its attention to particular institutions and doctrines.
I do not argue that this kind of study of legal change should dis-
place other kinds of legal scholarship, that it should be regarded as
the most important kind of scholarly activity for law professors, or
that it would best serve some mythical "primary function" of legal
scholarship. Nor do I believe that anyone is already doing it as it
should be done at its best. My claim is simply that it is desirable
that more and better effort be devoted to the interdisciplinary study
of legal evolution.
The second part of this paper argues that the scientific aspiration
of ISLE is a realistic one. My suggestion is that one can identify
t" Professor of Law, Harvard University.
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many interesting, testable generalizations about significant sets of le-
gal changes, and that often one can formulate and test explanations
of these general trends of change. The third part of the paper sug-
gests some semiformal methodological guidelines for use in ISLE. The
fourth part discusses the meaning, value, and limits of the interdis-
ciplinary component of ISLE. The fifth part assesses the reasons for
detailed focus on specific institutions and doctrines. The sixth and
final part offers some reflections on the functions and values of ISLE
and of other kinds of legal scholarship.
II. Feasibility
The cautious, anti-generalist law professor trained in adversarial
techniques and nourished by the Socratic method will be skeptical
of my program. He will object that actual changes in legal rules and
in the institutions that they shape are nearly always too complicated
to permit anyone to draw out of them generalizations that are defi-
nite in meaning, empirically disconfirmable by potentially obtainable
evidence, yet fairly simple and useful or interesting. Moreover, it will
be said, to devise reasonably complete, covering-law explanations1 of
any such general trends as may occasionally be shown to exist will
1. See W. DRAY, LAWS AND EXPLANATION IN HISTORY (1957) (coining name "covering
law model" for model of scientific explanation as deduction of real-world consequences
of general scientific laws); E. NAGEL, THE SrxucruRE OF SCIENCE 29-46 (1961) (the de-
ductive pattern of explanation); Hempel & Oppenheim, Studies in the Logic of Explana-
tion, 15 PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 135 (1948), reprinted in C. HEMPEL, ASPECTS OF SCIENTIFIC
EXPLANATION 245-90 (1965) (key formulation of deductive-nomological model). In more
recent times, many aspects of what Patrick Suppe has called the "Received View'-the
account of scientific theories by philosophers such as Hempel, Popper, and Carnap that
grew out of logical positivism, but survived much longer than that more general move-
ment-have been vigorously criticized-on the basis, for example, of Thomas Kuhn's
well known work, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, published in 1962. The
criticisms produced a period of Weltanschauungen or "world view" analyses of scien-
tific theory, and the perceived faults of these analyses have led other philosophers, such
as Dudley Shapere, to pursue more moderate approaches that might be called "historical
realism" about theories. See Suppes, The Search for Philosophical Understanding of
Scientific Theories, in THE STRuCTuRE OF SCIENTIFIC THEoiuEs 3-241 (P. Suppe ed. 1977);
Suppes, Afterword-1977, in THE STuaruRE OF SCIENTIFIC THEORIES 617-728 (P. Suppe
ed. 1977). Among the complaints about the Hempel and Popper views is that they
overemphasize the extent to which deduction, prediction, and testing characterize sci-
entific theorizing, and fail to appreciate the degree of immunity to falsification that
many theories have had. See Hilary Putnam's Scientific Explanation, in THE STRUCTURE
OF SCIENTIFIC THEORIES 424-33 (P. Suppe ed. 1977). But see van Fraasen, Putnam on the
Corroboration of Theories, in THE STucTruE OF SCIENTIFIc THEORIES 434-36 (P. Suppe
ed. 1977) (criticizing "pragmatic" views of Putnam).
These intramural disputes do not, I -think, affect my basic assumption throughout
the paper that legal scholars' lawlike generalizations should be established in meth-
odologically careful ways by reference to empirical evidence, and that doing so is im-
portant and valuable (for, inter alia, theory building).
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nearly always be a hopelessly complicated and ad hoc task, produc-
ing only weak results of no use for forecasting, retrodicting, or un-
derstanding other legal changes. After all, it is pretty clear-isn't it?
-that later generations of scholars demolished Langdell's notion that
law is a science, and something like a neo-Langdellian rashness lies
behind the concept of ISLE.
My answer to these objections is, "Not so." It is impossible to
prove the opposing propositions in any one work, of course, so I must
content myself with suggesting the feasibility of a program for the
study of legal evolution. I shall do this by reviewing some instances
of lawlike generalizations about important developments in legal
rules and law-shaped institutions. In some cases, I shall sketch what
seem to be reasonable explanations of these general trends.
The examples that will be reviewed are taken from my own work,
both published and unpublished. This fact causes me some embarrass-
ment, and prompts both a justification and an explanation. The jus-
tification is not that no good examples could be taken from the work
of other legal scholars (some could2), but that I am more aware of
underlying data with respect to each of my own examples, and there-
fore feel both reasonably confident of the validity of the generaliza-
tions and willing to be called to task for any alleged errors. The
explanation is simply that the questions put by the sponsors of this
symposium quite naturally led me to reflect at some length on what
I have actually been doing in my several years of writing on legal
subjects. Interestingly, the objectives and themes I have been repeat-
edly pursuing seem to be rather different from those that might be
suggested by any conventional description that I or others would
give of my own scholarship.3 Perhaps most academic lawyers who
have reflected on their work could make this observation. Having
reflected on my work, I still do not know whether academic lawyers
usually rationalize the past, finding in it a purpose and direction that
is not really there, or whether it usually leads one to uncover agendas
2. See, e.g., R. ADELSTIN, INSTITIONAL FUNCTION AND EVOLUTION IN THE CRIMINAL
PROCESS (1980); Kagan, Cartwright, Friedman, & Wheeler, The Business of State Supreme
Courts, 1870-1970, 30 STAN. L REV. 121 (1977); Kagan, Cartwright, Friedman, & Wheeler,
The Evolution of State Supreme Courts, 76 MIcH. L. REv. 961 (1978). See also notes 50-52,
54, 56 infra.
3. An observer might describe that scholarship as concerned with the corporate and
financial world and say that it is characterized by variety and broad scope, by a
tendency to classify and synthesize, by references to systematic empirical studies, by use
of concepts from economics, financial theory, and other disciplines, and by legislative-
reform proposals that often involve selective deregulation. But there is also a recurring
pattern of resort to stories about how the law has evolved.
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actually implicit in the past; but I am certain that both particular
legal scholars and the entire legal culture can follow intellectual pat-
terns without being aware of them 4 and that it is both possible and
useful to discover those patterns.
A. Some Apparently General Patterns of Change
Before reviewing examples, I shall describe two general patterns
of development that many of them seem to exemplify, or of which
they are a part. The first pattern has four phases. First, technological,
social, or other external changes occur that create new opportunities
for legal rules to reduce costs or disutilities of certain kinds. Those
costs are often transaction costs,5 though other costs and disutilities
also arise from particular risks and uncertainties. 6 Second, a respon-
sive legal invention occurs. A legal principle (or family of legal prin-
ciples), or an institution defined and shaped by legal principles, is
created or used anew; it reduces the costs or disutilities better than
identifiable alternatives; 7 and instances of the principle or institu-
tion proliferate. One is inevitably tempted to analogize the process
to Darwin's natural-selection view of the origin of species.8 Third,
the rise of the successful legal principle or institution itself creates
new needs and opportunities for cost reduction. Fourth, substantial
legal activity occurs-resulting in statutes, regulations, and case law
-in an apparent attempt to exploit these opportunities, or at least
with that objective result. In this phase, legal activity is apt to in-
volve fairly obvious struggles over the distribution of cost savings.
The two kinds of law-related cost reduction might be called "pri-
mary" and "secondary." These terms are relative, of course, and their
application will depend on where one starts the analysis. In many
applications, however, it will appear that primary cost reduction is
brought about by rather basic, simple principles of institutional de-
4. Cf. J. MARCH & J. OLr.N, AMBIGUrrY AND CHOICE IN ORGANIZATIONS 54-68 (2d ed.
1979) (organizational learning theory based in part on notion that people habitually
impose order, attribute meaning, and create explanations for ambiguous, past experience).
5. For example, a business firm not possessed of legal personality incurs large legal
and administrative expenses when it seeks to record deeds to real property in many
countries. Similarly, the creditors of a firm with thousands of owners but no limited
liability incur high costs when they try to enforce claims against owners' personal assets.
6. For example, some cost or disutility arises from the illiquidity risk of holding
ownership interests that are not freely transferable.
7. Often, the competition seems to be mainly among principles or institutions; at the
time, it is not immediately clear whether or how the cost saving to one group of peo-
ple comes at the expense of another.
8. See C. DARWIN, THE ORIGIN OF SPECIES BY MEANS OF NATURAL SELECTION (London
1859).
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sign, whereas secondary cost reduction is not achieved without a
lengthy, complex efflorescence of doctrinal detail. Legal developments
associated with secondary cost reduction are more likely, therefore,
to yield to analysis as an essentially "closed system," that is, as a sys-
tem in which lines of development in legal doctrine can usefully be
studied and explained without much appeal to changes in exogenous
factors.
I am not asserting that this recurrent pattern of change is the most
significant one, that it will be found in connection with legal devel-
opments outside the corporate and financial sphere, or even that it
will be found in many developments within that sphere. Those issues
await further study of legal evolution in particular contexts. More-
over, I am not asserting that the full set of law-related, cost-reducing
activities often, or even ever, proceeds to a socially optimal level.
A second, fairly general pattern of change illustrated by the ex-
amples below is the dose connection between changes in the size
of economic units or transactions and the subsequent development of
new institutions and rules. In particular. the great increase during
the last two hundred years in the size of business firms, in the num-
ber of investors or capitalists, and in the amount of wealth in the
economy-these developments, of course, are related-is extraordinar-
ily important in understanding the rise of new forms of organiza-
tions (first example), new roles and the laws governing them (second
example), new legal doctrines (third example), and new kinds of le-
gal proceedings (fourth example). Indeed, in the corporate and fi-
nancial area, scalar differences seem to be almost as important as
they are in physics and biology.
B. Some Examples of Legal Evolution
The examples offered differ greatly in the scope and specificity of
the developments analyzed. The first two presentations are fuller and
loosely follow the method of analysis proposed in the next part. The
others are more selective and sketchy.
1. Corporate Law
The development of corporate law and securities regulation in the
United States displays clearly both primary and secondary cost-re-
ducing activities that fit the postulated general pattern. Consider,
first, the primary phase and this testable description of the general
trend: in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, a legal
form of organization, the business corporation, began to appear with
1242
Vol. 90: 1238, 1981
Legal Evolution
increasing frequency as the vehicle within which an ever larger volume
of business was conducted. The process can be measured and tested in
various ways. For example, the percentage of gross business receipts
accounted for by businesses in corporate form increased substantially,
thus shifting the distribution of receipts away from businesses or-
ganized as partnerships, business trusts, and the like. The change can
properly be described as involving legal evolution because what oc-
curred was not merely a growth in large-scale business firms, but a
growth in one form of organization at the expense of competing forms.
A form of organization is constituted by a particular set of defining
legal principles. In the case of the corporate form, the set includes the
principles of limited liability, free transferability of shares, strong
legal personality, and centralized management.9 The business world
applied this constellation of principles much more than other con-
stellations. At the same time, the legal world created, refined, and
developed the principles of the corporate form. The emergence of
the corporation in its modem guise represents a legal invention.
An explanation of this legal invention, and of its competitive suc-
cess, may be proposed and tested. In the latter part of the nineteenth
century, certain conditions came to full force together: because of
technological changes, large-scale industries became feasible and ef-
ficient for the first time; the general level of wealth increased, but was
not extremely lopsided in distribution; and private ownership of capi-
tal goods was accepted as a social and legal norm. Under these con-
ditions, a form of organization that could facilitate both the aggre-
gation of large sums of capital from numerous scattered investors and
the operation and management of a large scale business was preferen-
tially selected over other forms by the cumulative decisions of ra-
tionally self-interested entrepreneurs and investors. The business cor-
poration was just such an efficient form. It can be shown analytically,
for example, that each of its defining legal characteristics lowers trans-
action or information costs of important kinds, or reduces significant
risks or uncertainties, better than the corresponding characteristics of
the partnership form.10 Some lawyers and commentators in the period
of the corporation's rapid growth clearly perceived these efficiencies. 1
Ever since that time, the corporate form has been selected or retained
for the larger business enterprises. Moreover, in principle one could
test the proposition that, other things being equal, large-scale business
9. See R. Clark, Corporate Law, ch. 1 (1981) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
Yale Law Journa).
10. See id. at 14-49.
11. See, e.g., W.W. Coox, THE COtPoRATiON PROBLxm 1-4 (1891).
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organizations in corporate form were more profitable to their man-
agers and investors than were other forms.
This evolutionary explanation should confront apparently incon-
sistent facts. For example, one of my colleagues has protested that the
major reason for the rapid increase in very large corporate firms in
the late nineteenth century was actually the oft-recognized wave of
mergers and acquisitions, many of them anticompetitive in intent.12
But this phenomenon is consistent with the evolutionary explanation.
To what extent businesses grew by acquisition rather than internally,
and to what extent acquisitions were anticompetitive, are questions
largely irrelevant to the proposition that big firms, however created,
were preferentially operated in corporate form. By contrast, it would
tend to disconfirm the evolutionary explanation if there were evi-
dence that the foilowing pattern occurred: whenever a number of
medium-sized corporate businesses merged, the controlling parties kept
the corporate form for the survivor; but whenever a number of me-
dium-sized noncorporate businesses consolidated, the controlling par-
ties kept the noncorporate form indefinitely. That is, the evolutionary
explanation would be weakened by evidence that assemblers of huge
combines of smaller units experienced no desire or need to shift to
the corporate form. Of course, that some first-wave consolidations of
smaller companies into long-lasting giants involved no real economies
and were based solely on anticompetitive schemes puts into perspective
my proposition that technological changes provided an impetus to the
creation of large-scale business enterprises. But it would be unpersua-
sive to go on to assert that the growth in the average size of business
firms-as compared, for example, to the average size in colonial times
-was not due in any substantial (if undetermined) part to technologi-
cal changes and real economies of scale.13
One virtue of the evolutionary explanation is that it suggests a sys-
tematic series of thought experiments for the purpose of analyzing
and understanding alternative paths of development. Alternative paths
12. The first of the three or four intense merger waves in the United States oc-
curred between 1887 and 1904 and involved approximately 15% of all assets and em-
ployees engaged in manufacturing at the turn of the century. Markham, Survey of Evi-
dence and Findings on Mergers, in BusiNrss CONCENTRATION AND PRICE POLICY 141, 157
(Universities-National Bureau of Economic Research ed. 1955). Of approximately 3000
independent-firm disappearances due to merger, 75% involved at least five firms. R.
NERSON, MERGER MOVEMENTs IN AMERICAN HIsToRY, 1895-1956, at 28-29 (1959). Because
many of these unions were horizontal consolidations in search of market dominance,
George Stigler has called them "mergers for monopoly." Stigler, Monopoly and Oligopoly
by Merger, AM. ECON. REv. (Papers and Proceedings), May 1950, at 23, 23-24.
13. See A. CHANDLER, THE VisinLE HAND 48-51, 75-78, 285-89, 337-39 (1977).
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might actually have been taken in other countries, or they might oc-
cur in the future as a result of planned or unplanned changes in the
relevant exogenous variables. By elaborating these possibilities, one
may check the power and utility of the original explanation.
Suppose, for example, that one of the three environmental condi-
tions favoring growth of the corporate form is changed. A society might
have a reasonably wide distribution of wealth and advanced tech-
nology, but little private ownership of capital goods. Perhaps this de-
scribes the Soviet Union today. In such a society, one would expect
the state to raise savings from its citizens and to channel them to busi-
ness enterprises. There would be little need for the dominant law of
the organization of state enterprises, which in a general sense could
be called the state's "corporate law," to provide for freely transferable
shares whose owners were automatically blessed with limited liability.
There would be less need than in our system for strong legal per-
sonality in some important respects, such as possession of indefinite
lifespan. Because the state that owns a business would be less likely
than a series of individual investors to risk destroying a firm's going-
concern value by demanding immediate repayment of its investment
in order to meet particular liquidity needs, and would have strong
incentives to preserve firms whose going-concern value exceeded their
liquidation value, there would be little need for legal rules that re-
strain an enterprise owner's ability to force a corporate liquidation.
In addition, one would expect management in a state-owned enter-
prise to be centralized (despite any rhetoric to the contrary) but not
necessarily insulated by deliberate legal rules from owner control, as
are our corporate managers. That is because the state-owned enter-
prise does not have a large number of owners for whom the costs of
communication and coordination are often prohibitive. In sum, the
organizational law of state-owned enterprise would be very different
from our corporate law in many major respects.
A more interesting pattern of law would exist in a society that al-
lowed private ownership of capital goods and had significant amounts
of advanced technology but a very lopsided distribution of wealth.
Perhaps this is the situation in some petroleum exporting countries.
In such a society there would be less need than in ours for limited
liability and free transferability of shares, because enterprises would
rarely have to raise capital from numerous scattered investors (from
domestic ones, at least). On the other hand, endowment of entities
with legal personality and rules allowing centralized management
would still be useful, even for a large enterprise owned by a mod-
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erately small number of investors. Accordingly, in such a society the
business corporation might not predominate. Instead, we might find
a number of joint ventures or partnerships, and if the corporate
form were copied blindly from other countries, we might find many
closely held corporations whose corporate characteristics are not fully
developed.
In the United States, secondary cost-reduction activities began once
the corporate form was strongly established. A general trend can be
identified in this secondary phase. The subject of corporate law (in-
cluding securities regulation) has developed in the direction of cu-
mulative doctrinal complexity, and most of it has been along a small
number of clearly identifiable lines. These lines of development may
be summarized as follows: the explication by case law and special rules
of the fiduciary duty of loyalty, which serves as a check on the abuse
of centralized managerial power; the development of exceptions to
the principle of limited liability, as in veil-piercing and equitable-
subordination cases, also to check abuse of managerial power; the
creation of rules, such as the securities laws' disclosure and antifraud
rules, designed to generate more and better information useful in
countering insiders' abuses, which are made possible by the frequent
transfer of shares; and the continued development of the contours
of legal personality, as in the charitable-contribution and social-re-
sponsibility cases, which concern the proper definition of corporate
purpose. These lines of development are extensions of the basic pos-
tulates of the corporate system, an elaboration made necessary by con-
troversies arising in new fact situations brought about by new institu-
tional form. These developments, which are amenable to understanding
by traditional doctrinal analysis accompanied by only limited refer-
ence to exogenous events and nonlegal concepts, occur more fre-
quently than do primary cost-reducing legal inventions.
The precise mechanisms by which these developments are initiated
and reinforced are difficult to specify. An important clue is that there
is a real bargaining game going on, not just various parties' unilateral
selections of legal options that are advantageous in market transac-
tions. Managers and shareholders have disparate powers and interests,
yet both groups have some influence with courts, legislatures, and
regulatory agencies such as the SEC. The fact that all states offer
corporate chartering on their own terms helps ensure that this struggle
will not be resolved definitively in favor of either group.14 Conse-
14. The phenomenon of competition in corporate charters has been recognized and
debated. William Cary sees the process as simply eroding shareholder protections, Cary,
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quently, each group is constantly pushing to modify the legal land-
scape in a direction favorable to its interests. Sometimes both groups
benefit from a change, but sometimes improvement for one group
comes at the expense of the other; at the very least, the distribution
of benefits is a bone of contention. In such a situation, in which
incompletely defined and perhaps conflicting basic postulates are es-
tablished, and parties with opposing interests face high stakes and
have access to lawmakers, cumulative doctrinal complexity is the
likely result."5
2. Laws Affecting Capitalists
In a recent law-review comment, 16 I argued that the history of capi-
talist enterprise has seen four successive stages of extremely rapid
growth of major institutions: large entrepreneurially founded cor-
porations, the modem publicly held corporations, financial interme-
diaries (or institutional investors), and collective savings vehicles such
as pension plans and group insurance plans. In the shift from the
first to the second stage, the entrepreneurial function was differen-
tiated into ownership and control, and the latter function was taken
over by the newly formed profession of business managers. In the
shift from the second to the third stage, the ownership function was
split into capital supplying and investment management, and the
latter was assumed by the new profession of portfolio managers. In
the shift from the third to the fourth stage, which is currently under
way, the capital-supplying function is itself being divided into bene-
ficial enjoyment and the decision to save, and the latter is being
carried out by group representatives and professional savings planners.
On the basis of this account of changes in the capitalist system, one
may venture a reasonably clear, lawlike generalization: the capital-
mobilizing function continually develops in the direction of increas-
ing specialization and professionalization of its decisionmaking as-
pects, on the one hand, and increasing scope for citizen participation
Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 670-84
(1974), but Ralph Winter has offered a rebuttal to Cary's arguments, Winter, State Law,
Shareholder Protection, and The Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 251,
254-62 (1977). Winter himself does not show affirmatively that the process produces
optimal results, and he properly concedes the need for federal preemption of state
antitakeover provisions. Id. at 287-89.
15. There may also be a tendency for specific cost-reducing rules to evolve that bene-
fit some parties without hurting others, but not many different, specific lines of de-
velopment will be subsumable under this tendency.
16. Clark, The Four Stages of Capitalism: Reflections on Investment Management
Treatises, 94 Hstv. L. REv. 561 (1981).
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in the income from real capital investment, on the other. In my com-
ment, I speculated on the mechanisms of generation, selection, and
development of the new roles. It is clear, for instance, that the emer-
gence of the four stages of capitalism is linked to great increases in
the sizes of the relevant economic units and transactions.
The major point of this analysis is that the growth of the charac-
teristic roles in each of the stages gives rise to the imposition of a
distinctive system of regulatory control. In the last three stages, the
legal regulations all attempt to protect the purported beneficiaries of
the newly dominant institutional arrangements and of their profes-
sional decisionmakers. The successive regulatory strategies include cor-
porate-law rules of fair play, the securities laws, the soundness regu-
lation of financial intermediaries, and the federal pension-reform law.
For good and specifiable reasons, these strategies have very different
principal objectives, yet their appearance suggests a lawlike generali-
zation about primary cost-reducing legal activity: whenever commer-
cial developments result in role specialization and in a rapid increase
in the number of decisionmakers that claim professional status and
discretionary powers, the legal system responds by creating a distinc-
tive body of law to protect those intended to be the beneficiaries or
"customers" of the professionals. Though this proposition is unavoid-
ably vague, it is hardly meaningless, and one can look for evidence
to confirm, disconfirm, or iodify it. Moreover, one can call on sig-
nificant bodies of existing work, such as the large sociological litera-
ture on the "professions," to infuse its key terms with operational
meaning.
Of course, each new field of law that is created in response to the
growth of a particular kind of professional power tends to take on a
life of its own and to exhibit its own logic of growth. Full investiga-
tion of these fields awaits future scholarship. I would propose, how-
ever, that these and other bodies of fiduciary-like law-law relating
to control of professional discretion that is supposed to be exercised
for another's benefit-are oriented to the reduction of avoidable and
unproductive uncertainty. For example, the rule forbidding directors
and officers to usurp corporate opportunities, which is a variation on
the hoary rule forbidding trustees to take "secret profits," makes sense
when seen as a way of preventing managers from covertly and unilat-
erally fixing their own reward for managerial services, and thus rais-
ing investor uncertainty and the cost of capital. As this example sug-
gests, fights over fiduciary principles may have both allocative and
distributive consequences.
1248
Vol. 90: 1238, 1981
Legal Evolution
3. Corporate Debtor-Creditor Law
The law of fraudulent conveyances, which has existed for thousands
of years, creates a kind of universal minimum-security agreement be-
tween debtors and creditors. It embodies a presumption that most
rational debtors and creditors would, if the issues were squarely pre-
sented to them, expressly contract for the minimal creditor-protection
rules it lays down. It thus lowers transaction costs by freeing parties
from continually having to negotiate and contract about very basic
rules of a common commercial relationship. 17 Yet, beginning in the
late nineteenth century, new bodies of law arose to provide minimal
rules for the protection of creditors of corporate debtors: the bank-
ruptcy doctrines of equitable subordination, cases allowing the pierc-
ing of the corporate veil, and statutes imposing restraints on dividends
and other corporate distributions."' These developments give rise to
a puzzle, for analysis has made it clear that the established principles
of fraudulent-conveyance law could be applied to the factual situa-
tions dealt with by these new rules, and that the policies and prin-
ciples behind the new rules are identical or very similar to those un-
derlying fraudulent-conveyance law.' 9 Why, then, did the new rules
arise when they did?
The general answer is that the rise of large modem corporate en-
terprises created new opportunities for cost reduction that could be
realized only by new specific rules implementing the old creditor-
protection principles. For example, the managers of a large corpora-
tion with numerous subsidiaries could cause thousands of transactions
to occur among the members of a corporate family. In an insolvency
proceeding involving this corporate family, the facts about a fair
sample of particular transactions, in addition to evidence that top man-
agement of the parent corporation had de facto power to direct most
of the transactions and an incentive to insist on terms that were biased
in certain ways, may justify inferring the existence of a general pat-
tern of transactions that were fraudulent or unfair to creditors of spec-
ified members of the corporate family. In situations of this kind, the
doctrine of equitable subordination offers a feasible remedy. Tradi-
tional fraudulent-conveyance rules, because of their insistence on prov-
17. In this respect, it is like many aspects of corporation law. See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAw 292-96 (2d ed. 1977); Brudney & Clark, A New Look at Corporate
Opportunities, 94 HARV. L. REV. 998 (1981).
18. Technically, the first of these three bodies of law can be invoked in bankruptcies
of debtors that are not corporations. But its main use is in the corporate context.
19. See Clark, The Duties of the Corporate Debtor to Its Creditors, 90 HAzv. L. REv.
505 (1977).
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ing each unfair transaction and measuring the amount of unfairness,
do not. Before the rise of large corporate enterprises, equitable-sub-
ordination doctrine, which allows courts to look at an entire situa-
tion rather than at minutiae when defining a wrong and to substi-
tute a shotgun for a rifle as the remedy, was less needed and less
justified. The paradigmatic case of a fraudulent conveyance was simply
that of the individual owner of a failing business who conveys title
to his business and personal assets to his wife or to a friend just a
short time before his creditors take him to court-or even, as in the
deservedly famous Tywne's Case,20 while the sheriff is riding over to
attach his goods. In these small-numbers situations, a sampling pro-
cedure is inapposite.
The story of equitable subordination is an important illustration
of the second general theme that one can discern in the evolution of
legal rules affecting business organizations and financial practices. Ma-
jor changes in size, such as growth in the number of participants in
business organizations, significantly affect the precise content and gen-
eral characteristics of legal rules relating to these organizations. One
can identify many examples of this phenomenon,21 and one can at-
tempt, with a fair hope of success, to identify abstract characteristics
that are common to rules designed for large organizations.
4. Corporate Reorganizations
The history of the law of creditors' remedies against business debt-
ors has at least five distinct phases. Each is characterized by the
emergence and widespread use of a legal procedure, or set of legal
principles, that significantly improved the efficiency of the debt-en-
forcement process for the benefit of creditors and, ultimately, of so-
ciety. This line of legal development is one of primary cost reduction.
Yet, in striking fashion, each of the later four legal inventions
(described below) created a need for more numerous or exacting valua-
tion procedures. Consequently, they created new needs and opportuni-
ties for cost-reducing legal safeguards against irrationality, inadequate
information, fraud, and other abuses in the valuation process. By the
mid-twentieth century, this movement had resulted in a hypertrophy
of rules, procedures, and litigation relating to questions of valuation.
This fact explains, and is evinced by, the notable preoccupation
with valuation that is displayed in the reorganization part of the
20. 3 Coke 80b, 76 Eng. Rep. 809 (Star Chamber 1601).
21. I attempt to do so throughout my forthcoming book on corporation law. R.
Clark, supra note 9.
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widely used casebook on corporate finance by Professors Brudney and
Chirelstein.22
Consider the five phases. In the beginning, of course, most com-
mercial societies developed legal collection remedies for individual
creditors, in part to reduce violence and other externality-producing
behavior accompanying self-help. The second step, taken in ancient
times by some societies, was the creation of collective procedures for
the whole group of creditors to collect from a debtor; that is, li-
quidation procedures such as those created by early insolvency and
bankruptcy laws. Closely entwined with liquidation procedures, in mo-
tivating concept and sometimes in practice, were rules voiding pref-
erential transfers. Group collection procedures not only offer the pos-
sibility of realizing economies of scale in creditors' efforts to realize
on the value of a debtor's assets; they also allow the reduction of
many costs created by the disorderly scramble of individual creditors
to be first to collect, regardless of any adverse impact on other credi-
tors or on the overall value to be realized on the debtor's assets.
Thus, one commentator has argued persuasively that rules about void-
able preferences serve the function of preventing an adverse outcome
in a situation that is structurally like the Prisoner's Dilemma of game
theory, and that those rules therefore eliminate some substantial costs
of uncoordinated action. 23 But because the laws naturally make the
debtor's insolvency (in one of many possible senses) a major part of
the complex of events that lead to application of a collective liquida-
tion procedure or of the rules about preferential transfers, they create
a need to determine whether liabilities (however defined) exceed as-
sets (however defined). To answer this question, some method of valu-
ing assets and liabilities must be chosen.
The third phase, which developed much later in history, involved
the use of receivers instead of sheriffs. A receivership can best be un-
derstood as a deliberately slowed-down liquidation procedure. Re-
ceivers are given adequate, flexible periods of time in which to operate
the debtor's business while looking for the best buyer or buyers. The
more time they have, the better the prices they might get for par-
ticular assets of the debtor. Even more important, they might find a
person to buy all or most of the business as a going concern and at
a price reflecting the true going-concern value, rather than at a dis-
22. V. BRUDNEY & M. CHIMELSN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CORPORATrE FINANCE 125-73
(2d ed. 1979).
23. Note, Preferential Transfers and the Value of the Insolvent Firm, 87 YALE J.
1449, 1451-54 (1978).
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tress price caused by forcing a quick sale in an illiquid or otherwise
imperfect market for particular kinds of capital goods and businesses.
Whenever the going-concern value of an insolvent debtor's business
exceeds its piecemeal liquidation value, and the receivership preserves
that excess value, there is a net gain for creditors and society. But this
efficient procedure creates a new valuation problem, for the receiver
or the supervising court must decide whether going-concern value does
in fact exceed liquidation value.
The fourth phase of development occurred in the United States
when the equity receivership evolved to the point where all or many
of the creditors of the insolvent business debtor could themselves act
as the buyers of the business-which would be kept as a going con-
cern, if that made sense-using not cash as the means of payment, but
their creditor claims, such as notes, bonds, debentures, or the like,
usually valued at face value plus accrued interest.24 The creditors
could, in effect, initiate a transformation of their debt holdings into
stock, or into some mixture of new debt and stock, and at the same
time exercise their contractual rights of priority among themselves and
against the residual claimants (the old shareholders) in a way that was
just as definitive as a real liquidation sale to an outside buyer. This
procedure made economic sense whenever there were no or few po-
tential outside buyers with accurate and timely information about
the true state of affairs and the future prospects of the business, and
when the process of searching for and informing outside buyers would
itself be very expensive.
On the other hand, the transformed receivership proceeding-trans-
formed because the usual aim was now to effect a smooth rehabili-
tation of the business rather than a true liquidation or sale-accen-
tuated valuation problems. Not only did it have to be determined
whether going-concern value exceeded liquidation value, but some
finite value had to be placed on the whole business. Otherwise, there
would be no way of telling where, down the contractually created
ranks of creditors and preferred shareholders, it was fair to stop issu-
ing shares and other claims in the newly organized entity owning the
business. When a liquidation or receivership results in a true sale
to outsiders for cash, this problem simply does not exist. After ex-
penses, the liquidator or receiver pays money to the creditors that are
24. My simplified account stresses the net result and ignores intermediate steps and
complications. For a good introductory discussion of the formal steps that were typi-
cally involved, see H. HENN, LAW OF CORPORATIONS 828-29 (2d ed. 1970).
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contractually most senior (for example, bond holders) until either no
money is left or their contractually specified due amounts are paid
in full; then he pays money to creditors in the next tier (for example,
debenture holders); and he continues in that fashion until the money
runs out. By contrast, when the business is not converted to cash or
its equivalent, the valuation problem must be faced in order to ac-
complish a distribution of new tickets. Moreover, the valuation prob-
lem is made more difficult by the conflicts of interest that various
groups of claimants have with respect to one another. In addition,
some groups, such as managers that are also substantial shareholders,
may have superior access to information, procedural powers to delay,
and other bargaining advantages that are irrelevant to the concept of
the receivership and hence felt to be unfair.
The fifth and final phase in the development of corporate debtor-
creditor law involved the formal establishment of a bankruptcy reor-
ganization law that offered a more structured version of the trans-
formed equity receivership. In the United States, this occurred most
definitively with the passage of the Chandler Act in 1938.25 The ritual
of the self-sale was dropped. All corporations in reorganization would
presumptively be subjects of a reorganization plan that would pri-
marily involve a reshuffling of the paper claims against the business
assets. Furthermore, such restructuring of debt might be accomplished
by a two-thirds majority vote within the classes of debtors, so that a
good plan might be forced on otherwise obstreperous creditors. These
refinements, however, simply increased the need for careful judicial
supervision of the valuation process.
It may be wondered why the final two or three phases in the de-
velopment of creditors' remedies occurred so late in the history of
trade and commerce. One explanation might be that lawyers in early
times simply failed to think of the legal inventions and their advan-
tages. The hypothesis would be that the timing of legal innovations
is basically a random matter, and that it takes time for ingenious per-
sons to happen to be put in contact with situations that admit of im-
provement, and to see the solutions. An alternative, more idea-oriented
explanation is that earlier lawyers were intellectually blinded by the
influence of their modes of legal thought. Some general shift in the
dominant conceptual frameworks or value systems of leading lawyers
25. Chandler Act, Pub. L. No. 75-696, 52 Stat. 840 (1938) (current version at 11 U.S.C.
§§ 101-1330 (Supp. III 1979)). Before this Act, Congress had adopted section 77 in 1933
to provide for railroad reorganizations and section 77B in 1934 to cover other corpora-
tions. These were replaced by Chapter X of the Chandler Act.
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was needed before the new procedures could be conceived, taken
seriously, and adopted.26
Both explanations may well have some validity. But the hypothesis
that seems most powerful to me is more economic and institutional:
only with the rise of very large business enterprises were there suffi-
ciently frequent and sizable economies of scale in debt-enforcement
proceedings to justify the legal innovations in question. Unless the
surplus of going-concern value over liquidation value was substantial,
as it might be for a large business, or the debtor business was so large
and complex that it would have been impossible or quite expensive
to find or to create a fair-sized pool of reasonably informed potential
outside buyers, the efficiency benefits of a receivership or reorganiza-
tion proceeding would not exceed the very substantial administrative,
negotiating, and legal costs of the proceeding itself.2 7 In principle,
this hypothesis can be tested against the historical evidence.
5. Priority Patterns
In an article on the evolution of patterns of legal priority among
secured creditors, I identified a succession of basic priority prin-
ciples. 28 These were labeled the "first-in-time" principle, the "posses-
sion" principle, the "paperizing" principle (as implemented, for ex-
ample, by the Statute of Frauds and by various rules giving special
privileges to holders of negotiable instruments), and the "recording"
(or "filing") principle. I analyzed these principles as ways of reducing
fraud and "unfixity" costs in secured transactions, and therefore as
secondary cost-reducing innovations within a legal field (secured trans-
actions law) that was itself a product of opportunities for a certain
kind of advantageous economic specialization. One of my main points
was that technological innovations, such as improvements in transpor-
tation, communication, and information-handling technology, have
changed the relative balance of advantages between the third and
fourth principles, and that this fact should have (and now is having)
an impact on the relative status of different priority rules.
26. See R. Gordon, Approaches to the Study of Legal Thought and Legal Practice
in Late 19th Century America (April 1980) (unpublished paper delivered at a Harvard
Law School Seminar on Basic Legal Research).
27. These costs are high in the more advanced proceedings because of the greater
need to consider valuation questions.
28. Clark, Abstract Rights versus Paper Rights under Article 9 of the Uniform Com-
niercial Code, 84 YA" L.J. 445, 473-79 (1975) ("evolution of the tendency to suppress
abstraction").
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6. Corporate Tax
In the most methodologically self-conscious examination of legal
evolution that I have undertaken,29 I identified seven postulates, or
starting points, of the system of federal income taxation of corpora-
tions and shareholders in the United States. Each axiom expressed a
basic principle of taxation actually adopted by lawmakers at an iden-
tifiable time in the past. For example, the seventh and most esoteric
principle declared that corporate distributions of property entail no
recognition of gain or loss at the corporate level. I also identified
and discussed several key principles describing the institutional pro-
cesses by which the axioms were elaborated, combined, and developed.
For example, I suggested that legislatures tend more than courts to
prescribe mechanical rules, whereas courts tend to adopt and to use
open-ended principles. These principles of development were used
in the analysis much as the rules of inference are used in formal de-
ductive systems. In addition, I mentioned some relevant environmen-
tal constraints, or background assumptions. For example, the study
assumed that corporate and individual tax rates would retain a cer-
tain basic relationship, and that the rates would be high enough to
make active struggle between taxpayers and the Internal Revenue Ser-
vice worthwhile. Finally, I interpreted the actual development of a
multitude of particular rules and small bodies of law in the corporate
tax field as the unfolding of the system of axioms in accordance with
the principles of inference. The ordering of many details in this way
demonstrated a significant general trend in the history of corporate
tax law: an increasingly complex accumulation of administrative regu-
lations, of holdings and principles in the case law, and of statutory
emendations along a small number of identifiable lines of development.
The axiomatic presentation of corporate tax law made it possible
to forecast, in a methodical and complete way, the effects on the de-
velopment of legal doctrine of various hypothetical changes in the
postulates. Thus, I attempted to show that one particular combination
of reforms of corporate tax law held promise as a way of greatly reduc-
ing the legal transaction costs of the present system.
Perhaps the main point of interest for students of legal evolution
is that this account of the corporate-tax culture did not-and, I think,
could not-interpret it as evolving mainly by the progressive intro-
duction of socially efficient, cost-reducing rules. The pattern of de-
velopment was not in accord with a model of natural selection of
29. Clark, The Morphogenesis of Subchapter C: An Essay in Statutory Evolution and
Reform, 87 Ymx LJ. 90 (1977).
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Pareto-superior outcomes, as are many primary legal developments;
rather, it was more or less in accord with a model of continued struggle
among opposing groups over externally fixed resources. The key facts
about the corporate-tax world were that both taxpayers and the In-
ternal Revenue Service had continual access to and some influence
on the important lawmakers, and that what one group gained, the
other lost. That situation was very likely to produce cumulative com-
plexity of legal rules without any offsetting social efficiencies, and
with the basic principles both ambiguous and conflicting in their
application to many fact situations, complexity became even more
likely.
In some respects, the developments in corporate tax law are similar
to those in the field of corporation law since the establishment of
its postulates. In both cases, basic ideas have, over a long period, been
unfolded, or elaborated, and made increasingly complex; in both
cases, the process is driven by the continuing struggle of opposing
groups (managers against shareholders, taxpayers against the IRS), all
of whom have access to courts, regulators, and legislators. One major
difference between the two fields of law is that the ratio of zero-sum
to nonzero-sum legal resolutions of problems is greater in the tax field
than in the corporate field. As a consequence, an analyst working in
corporate law is less likely to feel that the choice among alternative
legal rules is "arbitrary" or "conceptualistic."
It should be possible, after reflecting on the development of several
legal fields, to formulate and to test propositions about the fundamen-
tal determinants of certain major formal characteristics of legal de-
velopments. Why, for example, are zero-sum resolutions of problems
more common in some fields than in others? Why can some fields mean-
ingfully be reduced to a few basic principles, while others cannot?
Why in some fields does doctrine grow cumulatively complex, while
in others it does not? Why do developments in some legal fields seem
endogenous, that is, explainable with few references to changes in non-
legal influences, while those in other fields do not? Some work on
these problems has been attempted, 30 but much remains to be done.
III. Method
In this part, I propose a seven-step method for the construction and
validation of a full, formal study and explanation of a line of legal
evolution.
30. See, e.g., R. Clark, Notes toward a Theory of Legal Evolution (1978) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with Yale Law Journal).
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1. Define the trend. Describe the shift from rule (or rule complex)
A to rule B in what you take to be the relevant terminology. 31 If the
line of change has more than two stages, from A to B to ... N, iden-
tify and document the relevant common elements in the shift from
stage to stage. Examples of this step were given in the accounts of
the four stages of capitalism and of the five stages in the evolution
of remedies for creditors of businesses s2
2. Identify starting points. With respect to many primary cost-re-
ducing legal inventions, this will mean identifying the sources, wheth-
er in persons or in institutions, of the generation of new rules or of
the variations in old ones. For example, one can try to find out which
persons or groups wanted corporate limited liability and why. The
process is roughly analogous to the attempt, in the study of biological
evolution, to define and to account for genetic variations by a theory
of heredity and mutations. To be sure, one could fruitfully stipulate,
as did early theorists of biological evolution, that sources of generation
and variation exist but are random (that is, unexplained), and pro-
ceed to show how, given a random generation of new proposals for
legal rules, specified evolutionary mechanisms insure that rules with
certain characteristics (efficient rules, or complex and unstable rules,
or whatever) are preferentially selected. Nonetheless, identification of
sources generally helps to fill out and refine such explanations and
to make them more credible.
When the aim is to study the development of secondary cost-reduc-
ing legal rules or developments within a clearly defined and well-
established legal field, the injunction to identify starting points may
mean the identification of basic legal rules or principles. The inves-
tigations of corporate and corporate-tax law illustrate this process.33
3. Identify principles of development. Describe in general terms
how the starting points are elaborated, combined, or otherwise devel-
oped; that is, describe the "motor" of change. With respect to many
primary cost-reducing legal developments, this will mean identifying,
and finding evidence of, some evolutionary mechanism that selects
the rules in question over rival or alternative rules. For example, the
account of the establishment of the basic principles of corporate law
assumed that this role was to have been played by the decisions of
many rationally self-interested investors and managers.3 4
31. One should look for generalities wherever they are to be found. Accordingly, one
should have no preconceived, inflexible ideas about the appropriate units or categories
of analysis.
32. See pp. 1247-50 supra.
53. See pp. 1243-47, 1255-56 supra.
34. See pp. 1243-47 supra.
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With respect to fairly endogenous developments within a field of
law, to identify developmental principles may mean to describe those
individuals that characteristically play important roles in the field,
their differing incentives, the institutional setting in which they op-
erate, and the dynamics of the "game" they play. One example ap-
pears in the account of corporate tax law.35 Somewhat similar ones
appear in various attempts to model the behavior of regulatory agen-
cies and their constituents.36
4. Identify relevant conditions of development. In connection with
primary cost-reducing developments, specify those environmental con-
ditions that bear on how the mechanisms of selection actually operate
on the starting points. An example of this technique is the account
of environmental conditions favoring the rise of the corporate form
of organization.37 In other kinds of development, identify relevant
data about external events or exogenous variables that bear on how
other principles of development operate on the movement away from
starting points. An example of this process is the assumption in the
corporate-tax account that taxpayers and the IRS have certain basic
interests that determine what they have incentives to want to do.
5. Put the explanation together. Tie together the results of fol-
lowing the second, third, and fourth guidelines into an explanation
of the trend identified at the first stage. Ideally, this calls for gathering
independent evidence of the existence or validity of each element of
the explanation and of the existence of the defined trend. This is
where the hard work comes in, and where the methodology of the
social sciences may be of use.
6. Consider contrary facts and arguments. This entails, in the first
instance, that the explanation formulated at the fifth step be capable
of being falsified, or at least disconfirmed or "made infirm." Ideally,
one should state explicitly what data would disconfirm the explana-
tion, then actively search for that data and for any other data that
apparently conflicts with the explanation, and, finally, try to reconcile
apparently conflicting data with the explanation. In practice, of course,
the person that formulated the particular explanation or theory is not
in a good position to look for and to see conflicting data. This testing
function, together with the functions of generating objections to the
completeness or consistency of the explanation, and of developing and
35. See pp. 1255-56 supra.
36. See, e.g., Scott, The Dual Banking System: A Model of Competition in Regulation,
30 STN. L. REv. 1 (1977).
37. See pp. 1243-47 supra.
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finding support for allegedly superior alternative explanations, is best
performed by other scholars. The practical message of the sixth guide-
line, therefore, is that the scholar should expose his or her work to
criticism by publishing it, and then receive and consider criticism
when it occurs.
7. Do thought experiments on the explanatory factors, and when
feasible, test the results against the evidence. This step is critical, for
unless it is taken, it will be very difficult for the method to produce
explanatory patterns and lawlike generalizations that begin to look
like true science, or that might be combined with others into some-
thing that could responsibly be called a "theory" of legal evolution.
The guideline calls for a deliberate conceptual effort to vary one or
more of the explanatory elements produced in the second through
fourth steps and to analyze the impact on the defined trend. By me-
thodical variations of the explanation's parts, and by conscious effort
not to sneak in new explanatory elements as one considers the alter-
native scenarios, one can clarify and explicate the connections among
the ideas in the original explanation, and also predict how specified
alternative legal systems would evolve.
These methodical variations and their resulting predictions have
two main uses besides clarification of the logic of the original ex-
planation. First, some variations of the explanation may actually have
been exemplified by a past or present legal system other than the one
covered by the original explanation. If so, the actual trend of legal
evolution in the other system can be compared with that generated
by the thought experiment. In this way, the explanatory pattern can
be confirmed or disconfirmed. I tried to suggest briefly how this pro-
cess might work in the account of variations in the environmental
conditions favorable to the rise of the corporate form of organization. 8
Second, the thought experiments can help to predict future legal
evolution, and to analyze the precise consequences of certain delib-
erate changes in the elements of the explanation. Thus, by methodi-
cally varying all of the basic principles of a field of law, and using
the explanatory pattern to analyze the consequences, one can produce
a systematic, well-founded consideration and evaluation of possible
legal reforms. Such an analysis was offered in connection with the
corporate tax system.39
Would careful following of this seven-step method lead eventually
to something that could properly be called a theory of legal evolu-
38. See id.
39. Clark, supra note 29, at 135-62.
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tion? I do not know. The answer depends on whether there is signif-
icant order in the real legal world, and on whether legal scholars have
the mental power, the drive, and the resources to perceive the order
and to formulate a theory about it. My estimate is that application
of the method certainly would lead in many fields to the identifica-
tion and verification of lawlike generalizations about particular kinds
of legal change. These generalizations might be at a low level, but
they would be much more than mere descriptions or recountings of
what has happened. When enough of these generalizations have been
produced and confirmed, it may be possible to show that all or many
of them can be subsumed under, or perhaps even deduced from, a small
set of more general laws of change. 40 If and when such a stage of legal
scholarship is ever reached, one may then venture to say that scholars
have developed a general "theory" of legal change, without cheapening
the word or improperly suggesting an analogy to the prestigious
theories of the natural sciences.
IV. The Use of Other Disciplines
From the examples sketched in part two, and the guidelines pro.
posed in part three, it should be clear that systematic study of legal
evolution will often, though not always, lead the legal scholar to rely
heavily on concepts, data, and methods of organizing data that are
supplied by the social sciences. The program I have set forth thus
raises some familiar questions. Should legal scholars habitually resort
to the concepts and data of other disciplines? If they do, should they
work in the other discipline, or merely make use of it? Should they
restrict themselves to one other discipline, and if so, to which?
In considering the first of these questions, I begin by asking wheth-
er the function of academic lawyers should be exclusively determined
by their roles as instructors in professional schools, most of whose
graduates expect to practice law. The function of the law school as
a supply line to the legal profession may suggest that law professors
must carry out three kinds of tasks. First, they should learn well, and
then teach, bodies of basic legal doctrine-sets of principles and rules
that, compared to others, have a long expected life and may be gen-
erally applicable throughout the typical law graduate's career. Sec-
ond, they should learn, and then teach, lawyering skills, such as those
involved in analyzing fact situations and applying law to them, ar-
40. I would not say that the two "apparently general patterns of change" I iden-
tified above, see pp. 1241-42 supra, should be treated as "laws of change."
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guing cases, and planning transactions. Finally, as scholars, they should
function as commentators: they should develop and publish new
presentations of law-new compilations, simplifications, explanations,
and criticisms-as called for by the constant stream of new develop-
ments in the real legal world. One may naturally question whether,
within the constraints of time and means, they can do anything else.
In fact, they can and should. With commercial publishers' research
services greatly reducing the need for straight legal treatises,4 1 and with
distinct clinical programs teaching the skills of lawyering, the pro-
fessional functions of the law school do not demand that academic
lawyers abandon the quest for more academic kinds of understanding
that their position within a university entails. Assuming, then, that
some legal scholars are to strive for a "broader," "deeper," "more fun-
damental," "more philosophical," or otherwise more academic under-
standing of law, can or must they do so without straying from specif-
ically legal data and modes of thought?
They can, but in many areas their doing so will result in work
that is narrow, unimportant, uninspiring, and not conducive to an
understanding of how things change. Moreover, if purely legal research
is done with imagination and apparent ability to illuminate, it will
often be based, either overtly or covertly, on general economic, social,
or philosophical propositions that derive only from common sense,
from anecdotes or case studies, or from individual experience. Though
useful, these are inferior and incomplete guides to understanding and
criticism. Furthermore, the legal scholar that tries to go only part of
the way, borrowing only the bare theoretical concepts and explana-
tory schemes of another discipline (for example, economics) and rou-
tinely applying them to legal phenomena runs the risk of trying to
pull rabbits out of an empty hat, and of deluding himself into thinking
that he has done so. Good use of another discipline typically requires
that the legal scholar reconnoiter all available systematic empirical
studies that are relevant to his concerns, and find out how much
empirical evidence there is for the particular lawlike generalizations
he is importing from that discipline.
The second issue raised about the use of other disciplines is wheth-
er legal scholars should work "in" the other social sciences (together
with full-fledged social scientists, of course), instead of "raiding" the
41. Practicing lawyers too are performing traditional functions of the legal academic,
such as providing a unified overview and introduction to a field. E.g., J. FREUND, ANATOMY
OF A MERGER (1975). No academic lawyer has produced a comparably good exposition
of this subject.
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other field for good ideas and data. For instance, should not aca-
demic legal scholars make greater use of social science methods to
get new and reliable information about processes relevant to their
policy concerns? 42 Why were the program and the initial vigorous
efforts of the legal realists not sustained? To the second question, and
indirectly therefore to the first, the answer, I think, is that the dif-
ferent systems of incentives, peer pressures, and intellectual trends in
the law schools and in the social science departments make it difficult
to enlist good academic lawyers in detailed, time-consuming, original,
social scientific research on anything like a continuing basis. 43 There
are some happy exceptions, of course. Many economists do empirical
research that consists, apart from the tricky task of modeling, of little
more than finding already-collected numerical data and subjecting
it to statistical techniques, such as regression analysis, that many law
professors can readily learn. Consequently, a lawyer-and-economist
team may find it feasible to test some of their hypotheses against em-
pirical data without having to change or to jeopardize their careers.
But the same cannot be said of much original sociological or an-
thropological research that an academic lawyer might want to have
done. Studies like those of Wheeler and his coworkers on the evolu-
tion of state supreme courts are, unfortunately, rare.44
My neorealist view that academic lawyers typically find it feasible
to use the social sciences, though not to work in them in any substan-
tial sense, is not a gloomy or restrictive one. Often, when one is at-
tempting to understand or to assess some area of law, much impor-
tant, relevant data and some tested empirical generalizations already
exist in the literature of one of the social sciences. Often, good ma-
terial is simply waiting for someone to read it, understand it, and
synthesize it, and to make proper use of it in connection with a le-
gally sophisticated analysis of rules and institutions. Unless someone
makes a conscious effort to join them, elaborate empirical studies of
law-shaped institutions may exist in circles of citation and discussion
that are virtually isolated from equally elaborate legal commentaries
42. One noteworthy fact about lawyers! reluctance to collect information themselves
is that it was not until a sociology student finally decided to do the job that we ob-
tained data on how the Securities and Exchange Commission actually learns about cases
and decides what enforcement action to take. See S. Shapiro, Detecting Illegalities: A
Perspective on the Control of Securities Violations (1980) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation
in Yale University Library).
43. The best and most illuminating evidence on this point, I think, is Schlegel's
wonderful study of the fate of legal realism at Yale. Schlegel, American Legal Realism
and Empirical Social Science: From the Yale Experience, 28 BUFFALO L. REV. 459 (1979).
44. See note 2 supra.
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on legal rules and procedures, and on how practicing lawyers think
they work. Certainly this was true five years ago in the field I know
best, the law of financial intermediaries,45 and it seems obvious that
a similar situation now exists in fields such as health-care regulation.
In addition, of course, the social sciences' concepts and methods of
explanation are often available for use in the analysis of particular
problems.
The third issue I raised about the use of disciplines outside the law
is whether all legal scholars should devote themselves to the social
scientific discipline that is "best" for understanding the law, and ig-
nore the others. Although individual legal scholars may find it in-
feasible to resort to more than one other discipline, should the com-
munity of scholars as a whole also use only economics, for example?
The major reason for legal scholars to avoid so restrictive an approach
to their scholarship is that the several social sciences complement each
other; they are neither good substitutes for one another nor strict com-
petitors. Even though they are in very different states of theoretical
development, each can sometimes make contributions to the under-
standing of law that the others cannot make, or cannot make as well.
This is true in three respects.
First, different conceptual schemes are not equally useful for un-
derstanding different kinds or aspects of phenomena. The categories
and procedures of explanation that make up a conceptual scheme usu-
ally were designed to address phenomena at a particular level of gen-
erality and to focus on certain kinds of variables to the exclusion of
others. Their application to other realms may be intriguing but
limited. In most respects, for example, the aggregate operation of the
capital markets seems best approached by use of economics. On the
other hand, it appears that social psychologists have told us most about
the impact of divorce on the mental health of children, and their ex-
planations may usefully be taken into account in formulating family
law policy.
To analyze an issue such as whether to legalize gambling, several
social science fields may be useful. The economist may tell us that
legislation will lead to increased gambling activity because the effec-
45. Prior to two major articles that made extensive use of empirical studies and new
developments in economics and finance theory, Clark, The Soundness of Financial In-
termediaries, 86 YALE L.J. 1 (1976); Scott & Mayer, Risk and Regulation in Banking.
Some Proposals for Federal Deposit Insurance Reform, 23 STAN. L. REv. 857 (1971), much
prominent commentary in the legal literature on banks and insurance companies was
rather legalistic or concerned with conventional, uncritical accounts of history and policy.
Yet much relevant empirical work had been done by economists.
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tive cost to those who value gambling will be reduced, though the
reduction may be small if the previous costs of avoidance, such as
traveling to a nearby jurisdiction in which gambling was legal, were
not great. The behavioral psychologist may supply an equally impor-
tant idea: the view, which is supportable by experimental evidence,
that much gambling behavior is learned, and that certain schedules of
reinforcement for an activity, such as the variable-ratio schedules pro-
vided by slot machines, are more likely than others to generate strong,
persistent behavior patterns, or more generally, that the establishment
of accessible gambling-type contingencies in the human environment
will generate and sustain behavior patterns that otherwise would not
exist. In more conventional terms, not only the relative costs of satis-
fying different preferences will be altered; so too will the preferences
themselves. The psychoanalyst may offer a third idea, a psychological
explanation that is different from the behaviorist's. He might rather
explain gambling as reflecting an attempt to satisfy a fixed need or
to release ever-present psychic energy, so that if gambling is legally
blocked, some closely analogous behavior will surely pop up some-
where else.
Whether or not any of these views is supportable by the evidence-
I think the third is not-they all provide explanations of gambling be-
havior that may be of concern to legal policymakers. Each approaches
the problem from a perspective that is radically different from that
of the others. All are useful, though none of the three ideas intro-
duced by the social scientists will determine the selection of legal
policy. They simply shape the lines of argument and may make them
more rational.
A second way in which the social sciences are complementary is that
different conceptual schemes may give rise to different illuminating
hypotheses. For example, economists have focused on the question
whether the law becomes more efficient over time. Durkheim, a so-
ciologist, produced and offered support for the fascinating hypothesis
that the increasing division of labor in human societies has led to an
increasing ratio of cooperative legal rules to penal and repressive legal
rules.46 Donald Black, a contemporary sociologist, has offered and
given some evidence for a number of striking hypotheses, such as the
proposition that the amount of law in a society, measured in any of
a variety of ways, increases in proportion to the amount of stratifica-
tion, measured in any of several ways.47 In principle, there is no rea-
46. E. DURKHE!M, THE DIVISION o LABOR IN SOCETY 147-73 (2d ed. 1960).
47. D. BLACK, Ti BEHAVIOR OF LAW 11-36 (1976).
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son why an economist might not have formulated and developed these
ideas, but common sense tells us that it is not the sort of thing likely
to be generated within a purely economic framework.
The third way in which the social sciences complement each other
is that social scientists of different kinds are likely to generate valu-
able data of different kinds. In the study of health-care regulation,
for example, economists seem to have made the best use of systematic-
ally collected data (much of it collected by government agencies and
trade associations), but political scientists seem to have been best at
generating (that is, collecting and articulating in published form)
new, illuminating information-especially information of a sort that
is difficult to quantify-and at producing descriptive generalizations
about it.48
V. Institutional Orientation
In my judgment, the most productive kind of study of legal evolu-
tion at the present time consists of sustained efforts to establish gen-
eralizations and theories of the "middle range." 49 This means that
scholars should focus on particular sequences of legal doctrines and
law-shaped institutions rather than on abstract- characteristics of law
as a whole, or of a very large subset such as "the common law." My
aim is not to restrict scholars to tracing a line of cases and rationalizing
or criticizing them in the fashion of traditional commentary. Rather,
I urge scholars to study major doctrinal developments and discrete
fields of law as they have existed over long stretches of time. I also
encourage them to be constantly on the lookout for ways to relate
their results from many such inquiries to some general explanation
of legal change. On the other hand, I am skeptical of attempts to
short circuit the process by constructing plausible general theories
of legal evolution and then debating them in an exclusively a priori
fashion. The time is not ripe for choice among such general theories.
I do not mean that no effort should be made to invent general
theories or that provisional general theories may not serve as good
heuristic devices in studying evidence about particular legal develop-
ments. My main point is that we should all recognize that little can
reasonably be expected from present exercises in theory building.
48. See, e.g., T. MARMOR, THE PoLmTcS OF MEDiCARE (1973); B. VLADECK, UNLOVING
CARE: THE Nu.siNG HOME TAGEDY (1980).
49. This phrase is taken from the earlier debates among American sociologists, typi-
fied by Talcott Parsons on one side and Robert Merton on the other. See J. TuRNE
THE STRucruRE OF SOCIOLOGICAL THEoRY 69-71 (rev. ed. 1978).
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When built prematurely, general theories, besides being possibly in-
valid, may be deficient in meaning, utility, testability, and importance,
and there may be no good way to choose among them. It would be
unfortunate if all legal scholars were diverted by the joys of a-prior-
ism from more sober forms of work. Internalizing the conceptual
scheme of another discipline and moving directly into general theory
building is something like taking a stiff drink and jumping into a
hot tub: there is a certain danger of fatally drifting off.
Let me illustrate my reservations by commenting on one of the best
contemporary efforts at general theory building. In the law-and-eco-
nomics literature, a series of articles by Rubin,50 Priest,51 and Good-
man 52 offered different but related explanations of why the common
law became efficient. (These theorists assumed for their studies that,
as Posner has argued, common-law rules serve efficiency to a surpris-
ing degree. 53) Subsequent literature has attempted to extend, refine,
or modify the basic theme. 4 The named trio of theorists acknowl-
edged that their work grows out of analytical work on the decision to
settle or to go to trial. In a larger sense, their work is also a variation
of the Coase Theorem literature,55 whose premise is that affected par-
ties can negate an inefficient assignment of liabilities by bargaining
and "bribing," provided that the transaction costs of bargaining are
sufficiently low. Even if transaction costs are high, the evolutionary
theories now add, parties can sometimes negate inefficient rules by
going to court, provided, of course, that the costs of doing so are some-
times low enough relative to the expected benefits. The next move,
I suppose, is for someone to explore the idea that the affected parties
can sometimes negate inefficient rules by going to administrative agen-
cies or legislators, that is, by "relobbying" rather than by "relitigat-
ing" or by "bargaining away."
For present purposes, I will focus only on the early evolutionary
50. Rubin, Why is the Common Law Efficient? 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 51 (1977).
51. Priest, The Common Law Process and the Selection of Efficient Rules, 6 J. LEGAL
STUD. 65 (1977).
52. Goodman, An Economic Theory of the Evolution of the Common Law, 7 J. LEGAL
STUD. 393 (1978).
53. See R. POSNER, supra note 17.
54. See Cooter & Kornhauser, Can Litigation Improve the Law without the Help
of Judges? 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 139 (1980); Denzan, Litigation Expenditures as Private De-
terminants of Judicial Decisions: A Comment, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 295 (1979); Landes &
Posner, Adjudication as a Private Good, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 235 (1979); Michelman, Con-
stitutions, Statutes, and the Theory of Efficient Adjudication, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 431 (1980).
In a different but related vein, see J. Hirshleifer, Evolutionary Theory in Law and
Economics (manuscript prepared for Liberty Fund, Inc., Seminar on Evolutionary Theory
in Law and Economics, May 16-18, 1980) (on file with Yale Law Journal).
55. E.g., Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcoN. 1 (1960); Demsetz, When
Does the Rule of Liability Matter? I J. LEGAL STUD. 13 (1972).
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theory of George Priest, which is the most provocative one. (I hasten
to add that Priest has since left his early theory for more promising
ones.56) His argument in the early work is that inefficient legal rules
impose greater costs on the parties subject to them than do efficient
ones; that, other things being equal, parties are more likely to litigate
than to settle a dispute when the stakes are greater; that, therefore,
parties subject to inefficient rules will be more likely than other
parties to litigate rather than settle; that relitigation of an inefficient
rule may sometimes lead to its being overturned-assuming, at the
least, that judges are neither perfectly hostile to efficient rules nor per-
fectly able to distinguish efficient from inefficient ones; and that the
systematically biased input of litigated cases, plus the occasional over-
turning of inefficient rules, eventually increases the ratio of efficient
to inefficient rules among the whole set of legal rules with which
courts can deal. Because of this "selective relitigation effect," the evo-
lution of the common law toward efficiency can be explained, if need
be, without reference to many apparently relevant facts, such as judges'
preferences for efficient rules, or, indeed, without assuming that judges
have any thoughts or preferences at all.
Priest was careful to avoid taking any particular position on the
actual nature and impact of judges' preferences. He did not purport
to show that common-law rules are or ever will be "completely effi-
cient." Rather, Priest argued that
the rate at which efficient outcomes will be achieved will be a
function of the nature of the judicial bias for or against effi-
ciency, the frequency of relitigation of inefficient rules (itself
determined by the costs of litigation versus settlement, the prece-
dential effect of the rules and the extent of their inefficiency),
the rate of change of the social conditions that underlie various
disputes, and the adaptability of earlier surviving precedents to
the efficient resolution of new disputes.57
56. See Priest, Selective Characteristics of Litigation, 9 J. LEGAL ST D. 399 (1980).
This article develops a "relative indeterminacy theorem" reminiscent of the random-
walk theory of stock prices: under certain plausible conditions, such as the possibility
of mutual gains from settlement, equal access to precedent, and rational expectations,
disputes for which parties' estimates of success will conflict-thus prompting them to
litigate rather than settle-will be those for which true uncertainty exists in the sub-
stantive law. Consequently, although disputing parties will behave rationally and use
precedent as well as other information, new decisions will not be seen to be determined
by old ones. In fact, Priest claims, no theory of common-law decisionmaking will be
able to explain the outcomes of all litigated decisions. Priest's new theory has testable
implications-for example, the prediction that plaintiffs and defendants will win about
equally often in certain kinds of litigation-and he and some coworkers are now gather-
ing and processing relevant data.
57. Prlest supra note 51, at 81.
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A selective relitigation effect of some magnitude, Priest thought, is
bound to occur under almost any plausible set of values of these
variables.
I have reservations of four types about this theory. First, its mean-
ing does not seem specific enough to be very interesting or useful.
One has little sense of what kinds of legal rules to expect next in
any particular field of law. One is not told where or why subsets of
especially efficient or inefficient rules exist, or how efficient, com-
pared to any ideal or actual system, the common law is or will be.
Nor is one told what policy conclusions, if any, might follow from
the theory. The only pragmatic payoff I can identify is a vague feeling
that the world is basically all right; the theory is reassuring or legiti-
mizing rather than disturbing or critical.
I do not mean that highly general, nonspecific theories cannot be
good things. But those that are, such as some formulations of Dar-
win's theory of evolution, are often useful general descriptions of vast
numbers of particular descriptions of processes whose existence is fairly
well established. Even better, some very general theories, such as Max-
well's theory of electromagnetism, can be used, with the help of aux-
iliary statements, to deduce empirically well-established lower order
generalizations. Priest's theory is in neither of these positions.
Second, Priest offered no evidence for the theory. Being plausible,
we must remember, is not the same as being supported by evidence:
that the world "makes sense" in our minds only if we believe X does
not imply that X is true. We are supplied neither with supporting
examples of the theory nor with much discussion of the sort of evi-
dence that would falsify, disconfirm, or discredit the theory, or even
make it "infirm" or "less likely."
In my unrepentant logical-positivist viewA5 a theory should be treat-
ed as vacuous unless it is formulated so as to be falsifiable or in-
firmable by evidence yet to be collected. In principle, of course, some-
one could make a list of all litigable legal rules in existence at some
prior time (say, 1880),-assess each one to determine whether, in light
of the circumstances of the time, it was efficient or not, and construct
a ratio of efficient to inefficient rules; he could then repeat the pro-
58. The locus classicus of discussions of falsifiability and the like is K. POPPER, THE
LoGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DIsCovERY (2d ed. 1968). Subsequent philosophers of science have
spent much time debating the identity of the preferred concept (falsifiability? discon-
firmability?), its precise implications, and its role in actual scientific theorizing. See, e.g.,
I H. PUTNAM, MATHEMATICS, MATTER AND METHOm: PHILOsoPHIcAL PAPERS 250-69 (1975).
Of course, I am not confessing to any other views that are alleged to have been held
by logical positivists.
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cedure for a later time (say, 1950), and see whether in fact the magic
ratio had increased. Of course, a negative finding could be explained
on the ground that because of the press of numerous other forces and
developments, the selective-relitigation effect had not had enough
time to show itself, or that the system of judicial decisionmaking had
been changed by intervening events. Nonetheless, a negative finding
would demonstrate that the effect was not as strong as originally
expected.
The testing process I have just imagined would be a monumental
task. It would be at least as difficult as discerning past judges' pref-
erences from the historical record-a difficulty offered by both Rubin59
and Priest 0 as a drawback of more judge-centered theories of evolu-
tion. Moreover, if the task were attempted, the scholars doing it would
find, I think, many puzzling and unforeseen situations, patterns, and
relationships. If the testing process were approached by sampling-
looking, for example, only at legal rules in one or two particular fields
in both 1880 and 1950-then the task would be more manageable,
and the relevant scholars would be doing something like what my
program calls for. It would still be an open question, however, wheth-
er the samples represented the development pattern of other fields.
Finally, and perhaps most important, even if a variety of modest or
ambitious investigations led one to conclude that the ratio of effi-
cient to inefficient rules has increased over time, that fact in itself
would give little basis for choosing among the different theories of
Rubin, Priest, Goodman, or, for that matter, those who assert simply
that, whatever the terminology in which they express themselves, judges
do in fact prefer to adopt efficient rules and actively try to do so.
What is needed to make Priest's theory a nonvacuously distinct theory
is a different empirical test. In principle, such a test could probably
be specified, but the task of gathering relevant evidence might be a
forbidding one.
My third reservation about Priest's theory concerns the importance
of the selective-relitigation effect relative to other influences on legal
change. Although the concluding section of Priest's paper refers to a
"strong" tendency to efficient outcomes,81 the paper nowhere offers
either evidence or a good theoretical argument for that assertion. The
only practical way to get a fix on this question is by making detailed,
59. Rubin, supra note 50, at 65.
60. Priest, supra note 51, at 66.
61. Id. at 81.
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institutionally oriented investigations into the development of par-
ticular fields of doctrine.
Consider some possibilities. (i) Because the selective-relitigation ef-
fect is premised on a gradual, probabilistic process, the rate of evo-
lution toward efficient rules when judges are indifferent to efficiency
may be orders of magnitude smaller than the rate of evolution when
judges positively prefer efficiency. This possibility has a good parallel
in the contrast between the glacially slow process of biological evo-
lution, in" which tens of millions of years are small units, and the
much more rapid process of cultural evolution. Consequently, the
selective-relitigation effect could be a real but trivial factor in the
actual evolution of the common law.
(ii) If the selective-relitigation effect itself operates very slowly, all
sorts of more quickly changing influences have a greater chance to
affect the ratio of efficient to inefficient rules during any given
period. For instance, changed circumstances may make no longer
efficient some old, relatively unlitigated and efficient rules; this "nat-
ural" generation of inefficient rules may proceed faster than the se-
lective-relitigation effect can undo them. Litigants may go to legis-
latures to speed up, stop, or reverse the process of generating efficient
rules: they may lobby for statutes, for example, to stipulate presump-
tive limited liability for shareholders, to deny shareholders standing
to sue on certain matters, or to extend cumbersome appraisal rights
to new procedures. Courts themselves may impose standing barriers
that virtually squelch the relitigation of inefficient rules. Even if these
rules can themselves be litigated and eventually undone, evolution
to efficiency might be delayed for painfully long periods of time.
(iii) A court has some, perhaps great, power to reinterpret a case
presented by private parties as actually involving an efficient rule
that the court would like to examine and overturn. After all, most
of the time, litigants think principally about resolving particular dis-
putes, not about relitigating particular rules. They are quite happy
to win by arguing the facts, by arguing how established rules (effi-
cient or inefficient) should be applied to their situation, or by giving
the court a potpourri of alternative grounds of decision. Particular
disputes are often seen as involving a large number of different legal
rules-some efficient, some inefficient; some minor, some major-so
opportunities arise for a judge to relitigate some rule other than the
one that the poor victim of an inefficient rule had in mind. If the
parties cannot accurately predict judicial responses of this sort, the
selective-relitigation effect may be greatly slowed.
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(iv) A related point derives from the observation that alternative
rules on a single subject may display degrees of inefficiency. This
point is especially important for Rubin's variant of evolutionary theory.
He assumes that the party that suffers from the costs of an inefficient
rule can make a rational calculation of the following sort: if I re-
litigate this oppressive rule and do not prevail, all I will lose is my
litigation costs; if I relitigate and win, I will be free for the in-
definite future to enjoy the benefits of the alternative, efficient rule
that I have in mind; therefore, given the exact size of my expected
litigation costs, the great costs of continuing under the oppressive
rule, and so forth, I will (or will not) relitigate this rule. The problem
with this calculation is that there may well be a third possibility: I
may relitigate an inefficient rule, and the judge may use the occasion
to impose an even more inefficient one on me. Once this possibility
is taken into account,62 it is not at all clear that there cannot be
significant periods of time and areas of law in which inefficient rules
are systematically relitigated no more, or even less, frequently than
efficient ones.
My fourth observation about Priest's early theory concerns its ex-
tension beyond the common law. Priest thought that the selective-
relitigation effect is felt not just in traditional common-law adjudica-
tion but even when the courts are interpreting statutes or constitutions.
One must be grateful for this extension: it offers new possibilities for
testing the theory. It also gives me reason to opine that the theory,
or its extension, seems disconfirmed by the progression of case-law
developments in the corporate tax field.
My tentative appraisal is that it would be false to say that the ratio
of efficient to inefficient case-law rules in the corporate tax field has
increased since the establishment of the tax about three quarters of
a century ago. My tentativeness results in part from uncertainty about
whether we are supposed to treat each new statutory or regulatory
provision as starting a new line of evolution on which to test Priest's
62. This possibility does not represent an imaginary fear. Consider the case of United
States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966), and other antitrust decisions of the
Warren Court, in which, not once, but repeatedly, litigating antitrust defendants not
only failed to have a rule interpreted or changed in a way favorable to them, but had
matters made worse for them. Moreover, if we are to believe the analyses of commentators
such as Bork, R. BORK, THE ANTITRusT PARADox 217-62 (1978), and Posner, R. PosNER,
ANTIntuST LAw 96-134 (1976)-ironically perhaps, it is the Chicago-trained commentators
that are harshest on the trend of the decisions, although Areeda and Turner are also
critical, albeit with a milder tone, 4 P. AREEDA & D. TURNER, ANnTRUsr LAw 29-32, 84-
89 (1980)-we seem led inevitably to the conclusion that the Court was laying down rules
that were progressively more inefficient.
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theory. If so, the selective-relitigation effect would, because of the
vast number of statutory and regulatory changes, probably turn out
to be trivial. I am also uncertain about what efficiency should mean
in the context. The allocative effects of corporate tax law seem to be
determined mostly by its postulates rather than by the way particular
problems within the fields have been resolved. In any event, par-
ticular problems are often resolved by fighting about the appropriate-
ness of competing analogies, and seem to have random, if any, al-
locative consequences. If efficient rules are those that reduce legal
transaction costs involved in disputes over taxation, it would appear
that the rules have become dramatically more inefficient over time.
On the other hand, certain judicial developments, such as the busi-
ness purpose doctrine, might be construed as helping to achieve a
kind of tax neutrality that prevents an increase in the allocative in-
efficiency or "excess burden" that is inevitably created by the corporate
tax. Demonstrating the validity of this interpretation, however, would
be a difficult task and by itself would not justify an overall assess-
ment of increasing efficiency in this field.
Most of my reservations about Priest's early theory concern its
most provocative aspects: it is a very general theory built by specula-
tive reasoning upon a small number of concepts and is deliberately
designed to rest on as few empirical propositions as possible. Of course,
generality, speculation, reasoning, and parsimony are virtues in a
theorist. But avoiding the risk or effort of resorting to empirical propo-
sitions in the building of a theory can easily mean that it will have
no definite or important empirical implications. Regrettably, perhaps,
there is no way one can pull a rabbit out of an empty hat.
VI. Payoffs
The interdisciplinary study of legal evolution, if pursued well, should
produce results similar to those of other near-scientific endeavors that
have succeeded: an improved ability to understand, to predict, and to
control broad legal changes. The earlier discussion treated the feas-
ibility of achieving such results and the methods, types, and levels
of study likely to produce them. It may now be asked whether ISLE
serves the ideal function of legal scholarship, whatever that may be,
and whether it should displace other kinds of legal scholarship or be
regarded as a "higher" form of scholarship.
There is no single ideal or primary function of legal scholarship.
Legal academics should make various scholarly efforts, to serve various
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useful functions. Good teaching materials and clear but entirely de-
scriptive expositions of fields of law can have enormous value to stu-
dents. How-to books and quick summaries of rapidly developing fields
of law can be invaluable to practicing lawyers. Reform-oriented case
commentaries and law-review articles about current legal problems
may occasionally have important and good effects on legal develop-
ments. Academic legal scholarship can also provide scholars in other
fields with information and ideas useful for developing their own un-
derstanding of the world. Whether the consumers of legal scholar-
ship are students, practicing lawyers, judges and lawmakers (or those
who help or have access to them), or the academic community at large,
there will be situations in which a particular law professor has a com-
parative advantage in doing a particular task and therefore should
feel justified in doing it.
Yet law school professors, most notably when they admit new mem-
bers into their ranks, do not value all kinds of scholarship equally.
In many schools, the more academic kinds of scholarship are more
prestigious. Can this practice be justified as reflecting the greater so-
cial value of more academic kinds of scholarship? I do not know, but
I strongly doubt it. Can the practice be justified in some other way?
I think it can be. One clue is that the product produced by scholars
is, to a large extent, a public good.e3 The benefits of the scholarship
can be consumed by many people without impairing its value to oth-
ers, and it is impossible for the creator to exclude all nonpaying per-
sons from reaping the benefits.
The author of a useful student guide will be repaid in royalties.
The author of a good how-to-do-it book will be rewarded even more
richly. But the practical benefits of broad historical, theoretical, and
empirical investigations into the law are likely to be indirect, cumu-
lative, and far off in the future. This makes it almost impossible to
identify the benefits, let alone to attribute particular benefits to par-
ticular people. The academic scholar is hard pressed to find a sig-
nificant audience of living persons to pay for his results, and once
those results are published, they are accessible to almost anyone that
can find a university library. Yet, for all that, the academic's work
may play an important role in the longrun process of understanding
the legal system. My suggestion, then, is that the prestige accorded
to academic scholarship-a prestige that can translate into some rather
tangible benefits-represents one form of subsidy of a product that
is a public good.
63. See Ackerman, The Marketplace of Ideas, 90 YALE L.J. 1131, 1135-41 (1981).
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From another perspective, prestige amounts to a desirable form of
social insurance. It is probably true that a great proportion of honest,
diligent, intelligent, and technically successful academic scholarship
leads to no practical benefits whatsoever, that the lines of inquiry
that do have payoffs have very great ones, and that the scholarship that
will have a payoff is hard to identify in advance. Because of this situa-
tion, scholarly chances that should be taken according to -some social
cost-benefit calculus would not be taken by individuals, who are usually
more risk averse than society as a whole, if their rewards depend on
the creation of demonstrably useful results. Accordingly, scholars are
partially insured against personal failure by their eligibility for at
least some of the prestige subsidy as long as they make a good try. As
a part of this system, work is evaluated and rewarded by peers, not
by outsiders with sharply defined particular interests, and the evalua-
tion is concerned not with demonstrable social benefit, but with other
alleged scholarly virtues, such as thoroughness, creativity, and breadth.
Some of these virtues may be statistically correlated with the produc-
tion of work that later yields social benefits outside the original aca-
demic circle, but even that much is not certain.
I would hate to end by suggesting that present practices are per-
fectly rational. The fact is that much scholarship is done because it
is a good in itself to those who do it: it keeps our minds pleasantly
busy and provides a reason for social experiences such as this sym-
posium. Moreover, for reasons that have little or nothing to do with
ultimate social utility, fads occur in trends of legal scholarship and
in the kinds of academic scholarship that attract the greatest prestige.
There is much reason, therefore, for those who toil in the celestial
gardens of academe to be suitably humble.
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